FranceNuc.org
Papeete
November 26, 2008
An Indemnity Law for Victims of Nuclear Tests, But with No Beneficiaries
by Bruno Barrillot*
In an interview with Le Parisien, November 26, 2008, the Defense Minister, Hervé Morin lifted the veil over the future government bill** to compensate the victims of nuclear tests. It is sheer hypocrisy! Under the appearance of state "generosity" and even of recognition of responsibility toward victims of tests, there is a real denial of justice for the victims of nuclear tests.
Indeed, contrary to French legislation on professional illnesses based on the principle of presumption of a link between the illness and the presence of the person on nuclear sites, the Minister is establishing a procedure that will ensure that there will be practically no beneficiaries of the indemnity fund.
Mr. Morin announces that he is going to introduce "an exposure threshold beyond which indemnity requests will be considered." And he states that the levels of exposure of personnel have been kept in the archives of the Defense Ministry.
First of all, this statement is false for all the personnel who participated in the Sahara tests except for those present at the May 1, 1962 accident. The dosage measurements of the Sahara personnel were not kept, according to Mr. Jurien de la Gravière, the delegate to Defense Nuclear Safety. That is at least what he announced in excluding all personnel of the Sahara tests from the study of veterans about which he informed the company "Sepia Santé."
Next, if the Defense Ministry bases itself on the consistent statements of Mr. Jurien de la Gravière and of "his" experts of the Academies of Science and Medicine, there were no health effects confirmed below an exposure level of 100 mSv (millisieverts) per year. If one takes into account the figures given in the Defense Ministry's book The Radiological Dimension of the Polynesian Nuclear Tests (pp. 253 and 254), there were, in Polynesia, three instances in which doses exceeded levels between 50 and 200 mSv for the period of the aerial tests (1966-74) and 0 (none) for the period of the underground tests (1975-96).
It is likely that the Defense Ministry does not trust these ridiculous figures and takes into account the present norms for protection from radiation, i.e. the maximum annual permissible doses of 1 mSv established for the public by the International Commission of Protection from Radiation (ICPR). For that possibility, we have still more figures published in the Defense Ministry book. They concern personnel who have worked as civilians or have been assigned for military service on Moruroa or Fangataufa. The book does not count 1594 exposures above 1 mSv for the period of the aerial tests and 336 exposures above 1 mSv for the period of the underground tests, or a total of 1930 cases that would be eligible for compensation...on condition that these persons be affected by illnesses on the list of the application decree and that the victims or persons eligible to make a claim for them wish to request an indemnity.
It is necessary to note also the methods used by the radiation protection services of the nuclear sites. The large majority of the Polynesian laborers and French soldiers there were "exempted" from dosage measurements. "You were not assigned to tasks subject to radiation", answers the Defense Ministry to the former workers who now are asking for their health records. So no dosage measurements mean no indemnity for victims of leukemia, cancer or heart problems who worked at Moruroa...And what about the people of the islands near Moruroa, in the Gambier Islands, on Tureia and on East Tuamotu who, obviously, never had the least knowledge of dosage measurements?
The Morin bill disdains current research in radiobiology. The studies of Professors Al Rowland and Parmentier on the veterans of the British tests on Christmas Island and recommendations of the special commission of the U.N., the UNSCEAR, state that there is no exposure "threshold" when it comes to the health consequences to a living being of radiation or contamination. Thus, the Morin bill is regressive and not in conformity with scientific data.
Moreover, no action in concert with the victims' associations and their scientific and legal experts was taken by the Ministry of defense except for one or two meetings with a member of Mr. Morin's cabinet on the over-all problem of nuclear tests. This is once again a deception of public opinion and a denial of democracy.
So then, lacking the adoption of the principle of presumption, the Morin bill is a huge bait and switch designed to deceive public opinion. The state recognizes its responsibilities. We approve. But for the state this will be at no cost.
*Bruno Barrillot is the author of numerous books and reports on the French military nuclear establishment, including Les essais nucléaires français 1960-1996 (1996), Audit atomique (1999), and L'héritage de la bombe (2002). This essay was translated by Robert M. Davis.
**For a summary of the situation in regard to compensation by Nic Maclellan click here.
Update: 1/12/09
In late December 2008, Bruno Barrillot and others concerned about the government's bill met with members of the French Ministry of Defense in Paris. Their views were listened to, but as of now they do not know if these views will actually impact the bill that the government submits to parliament.