II. CAPACITY

III. STRUCTURE

IV. WASTES RECEIVED

V. CLOSURE

VI. PROBLEMS

In June 1969 the CEA was authorized to create the storage center, and contracted with Infratome, a subsidiary of Potasses d'Alsace, to operate it. In 1979 Infratome ceased to exist, and Andra became the operator. However it was not until 1994 that Andra filed its request for authorization to operate the site. The authorization decree was signed March 24, 1995 [JO 26.iii.95].

Storage of the 400,000 cubic meters provided for should have led to the closing of the saturated site before the end of the eighties, but "a decision by the management committee of Andra, in November 1990 caused storage to be continued into 94" [Acro 93]. To obtain space, Andra dismantled several buildings inside the enclosure [ Van Hoesen 88]. At no moment was "the capacity of the CSM in terms of volume fixed by regulation" [Wise 95a].

In the beginning "a storage area specially fitted out" with a slope to assure drainage; simple trenches; and concrete trenches were used [Barbreau 70]. Andra built "tumuli" and "monoliths." For the monoliths a big trench was dug. The bottom was covered with concrete; then boxes were delineated with the help of panels. Concrete was poured on when layers of packages filled the trench. The monoliths were built in pairs, with sufficient space between each two to store irradiating packages.

The " tumuli" were constructed on the roofs of monoliths. Blocks of concrete were piled on the edges of the roofs and metal casks in the interior. Gravel was poured on the piles and covered with clay and then with earth [AndCm 86].

Between 1969 and the eighties, rainwater from the zones in use was discharged by means of trenches into the Sainte-Hélène. Water from the below-ground storage areas was transferred to the Cogéma plant to be released into the sea. In 1980 Andra established a separate surface network that transferred water that had been in contact with waste packages to Cogéma for treatment.

This network was abandoned little by little in favor of a separate, buried gravity network (Réseau Séparatif Gravitaire Enterré, RSGE). Construction of the RSGE was completed in 1992. However, it is not completely effective-some slabs are “fractured” or even “broken”-according to an Andra document.

Since 1988 the only releases into the Sainte Hélène are rainwater as a result of heavy rains. Today a new rainwater network, adapted to the collection of water from the cover over the waste facilities, is replacing the initial rainwater network. During the surveillance phase, Andra plans to release all rainwater into the Sainte Hélène by means of this network, because the cover is supposed “to guarantee” the absence of contamination [Acro 99].

According to Andra, the wastes received come from the CEA (20.0%), from Cogéma (35.0%), from EDF (35.1%), and from various other sources (9.9%). Acro calculates that the various wastes of military origin “represent about 40% of the alpha activity stored and 43% of the activity from plutonium at the site” [Acro 99].

For the 1985 public inquiry, Andra estimated the activity of wastes when received to have been 382,000 GBq alpha and 41,000,000 GBq beta/gamma. In 1987, after consolidation of an inventory and for a meeting of the Commission de surveillance du CSM, Andra estimated the activity, still when the waste was received, to have been 431,000 GBq alpha and 46,500 GBq beta/gamma. For tritium, Andra presented an overall figure of 898,017 GBq in 1995; in 1997, 1,270,000 GBq.

According to the 1995 dossier submitted by Andra in preparation for CSM's entry into the surveillance mode, for the period from 1969 to the end of 1984 the authorities have only "hand written information in the form of declarations drawn up by the producers or in the form of notebooks on arrivals and storage at CSM". Even in the nineties, verification of the contents of the packages occurred virtually only on paper. "The Andra dossier contains no indication of the number of verifications by destructive methods, the only way of really knowing the contents of a package." [Wise 95a].

Between 1969 and 1976 there was no limit on the contents of waste in terms of alpha emitters. From 1976 to 1985 the limits were "voluntary" [Wise 95a]. The basic safety rule (RFS I.2), which set safety objectives for the surface storage centers, did not go into force until 1985.

CSM has no authorization to emit effluents "apart from a prefectoral decree not signed by the ministers concerned,” which “authorizes” the release of up to 1000 Bq/l of tritium into the Sainte Hélène. The association Acro carries out radiological surveillance, which has found contamination of the surface waters and sediments around the center, and even Andra admits to the release of liquid effluents into the environment. Andra announced publicly, for example, at Cherbourg November 10, 1995, that measurements in the third quarter of 1995 show average levels of tritium in the Sainte Hélène and the Grand Bel to be respectively 181 Bq/l et 757 Bq/l [Wise 95a].

In the nineties, Andra took steps to end operations, including installing what Andra considers to be the definitive cover. In 1995, the agency filed a demand for modification of the authorization in order to change the statute to permit the end of the period of operation and the beginning of the monitoring phase. Following a public inquiry, the inquiry commission declared itself to be in favor of the closure.

At the beginning of 1996, the government nevertheless set up an “independent” scientific commission, which submitted its report July 16, 1996. According to the commission, presided over by M. Turpin, the CSM will not be able to be released for unrestricted use after 300 years as planned, and the cover installed by Andra cannot guarantee confinement. The commission recommended completing the cover that was under construction and then installing a definitive cover composed of natural materials. The waste should not be removed: “Such an operation would have a radiological cost (…) and its inconveniences and risks are greater than the inconveniences and risks of storage.” Following this report, the government announced that Andra would draw up a new dossier to be submitted to a new public inquiry.

The cover conceived by Andra was installed. Andra went back through the public inquiry procedure for authorization to embark on the surveillance period. The request was accompanied this time by a request for authorization for release of effluents into the environment. The commission responsible for the public inquiry gave its final report to the prefect June 26, 2000. It agreed to the monitoring phase proposed by Andra, but with three reservations:  These reservations concerned lengthening by ten years the first monitoring phase;  studying the establishment of increased means of monitoring near the structures presenting the greatest risk; and setting up an inspection and maintenance program for the network of drains that collect the water circulating through the storage center.  The prefect sent its report to DSIN, which prepared a proposed authorization for the monitoring phase and a proposed authorization of releases. The proposals were examined by the Interministerial Commission on INBs, and by the Departmental Health Council for La Manche respectively [DSIN 00]..

January 10, 2003 decrees authorizing Andra to implement the monitoring phase and to release gaseous and liquid effluents were signed by the relevant ministers.  The former requires Andra to submit to DSIN no later than six years after its publication a definitive safety report on the entire installation as well as a report on the advisability of installing a new and more durable cover in order to ensure, in a passive manner, the safety of the site over the long term [DSIN 02; JO 1.11.03].

--updated 5 March 2004

The CSM is located on marshy land, the Hauts-Marais, where the underground water is near the surface. A document of the Institute for Protection and Nuclear Safety (IPSN) indicates that the water table could be “less than 1 to 2 meters below the surface” when the groundwater is at its highest level, which means that the water would be above certain wastes [CEA-IPSN 79]. Andra claims that the CSM is tight [Andra 93], but has never technically demonstrated this concept. Moreover, Andra is not able to guarantee that the ground water does not inundate the waste, given the high level of the water.

Acro calculates, from data given by Andra, that the alpha activity of the stored wastes at the end of the surveillance phase will be on the order of 568 MBq/t although RFS number I.2. limits the content in alpha emitters to 370 MBq/t. Moreover, given the data of Andra, Wise-Paris shows that the CSM’s wastes contain almost 100 kg of plutonium and almost 200 t of uranium [Wise 95a].

The Turpin commission found that the Fontenay and Valduc centers took waste out of storage and sent it to the CSM in the years immediately preceding the introduction of regulations tightening up the allowable levels of alpha emitters at the CSM. Moreover, a document of Andra received by Acro indicates that wastes contaminated with plutonium were arriving at the CSM in perishable packaging, not protected by an outer covering, into 1994, just before the definitive closure of the center [Acron iii.96].

In regard to tritium, Acro expresses “the most extreme reservations” about Andra’s figure-1,270,000 GBq stored. This figure is less than the 1, 850,000 GBq “lost in the ground” during a 1976 leak [Acro 99].

A document sent anonymously to Acro after the 1995 public inquiry indicated that the level of tritium in the underground water increased continually in numerous piezometers after 1976 and that when a piezometer presented a problem “it was plugged” [Acron iii.96]. 

The principal source of tritium in the surface water around the CSM is the groundwater, polluted in 1976, but the center is continually adding to this contamination. According to an Andra report quoted by Acro, “from the time that the cover was put into place, tritium was measured in its drainage network on and under the asphalt membrane.

The Center stores “25,000 t of metallic lead, 2,200 t of lead sulfate, 15 t of cadmium, 0.9 t of mercury,” according to the Turpin commission. The metals will never disappear [Acro 99].

In spite of the law of December 30, 1991, forbidding the storage in France of imported radioactive waste [JO l.i.92], the majority of the waste described as weakly active coming from reprocessing in UP2, including waste from the reprocessing of foreign fuel from 1996 to 1990, are found under the cover at CSM. [Wise 95a].

In order to carry out the projected surveillance, a budget of 12 to 13 million francs a year until the year 2300 will be necessary. M. Kaluzny, director of Andra, has wondered himself: “Do financial instruments guaranteeing such revenues for three hundred years actually exist?” [LeMo l.xi.95].