II. CAPACITY

III. STRUCTURE

IV. WASTES RECEIVED

V. CLOSURE

VI. PROBLEMS

In June 1969 the CEA was authorized to create the storage center, and contracted with Infratome, a subsidiary of Potasses d'Alsace, to operate it. In 1979 Infratome ceased to exist, and Andra became the operator. However it was not until 1994 that Andra filed its request for authorization to operate the site. The authorization decree was signed March 24, 1995 [JO 26.iii.95].

Storage of the 400,000 cubic meters provided for should have led to the closing of the saturated site before the end of the eighties, but "a decision by the management committee of Andra, in November 1990 caused storage to be continued into 94" [Acro 93]. To obtain space, Andra dismantled several buildings inside the enclosure [ Van Hoesen 88]. At no moment was "the capacity of the CSM in terms of volume fixed by regulation" [Wise 95a].

In the beginning "a storage area specially fitted out" with a slope to assure drainage; simple trenches; and concrete trenches was used [Barbreau 70]. Andra built "tumuli" and "monoliths."    For the monoliths a big trench was dug. The bottom was covered with concrete; then boxes were delineated with the help of panels. Concrete was poured on when layers of packages filled the trench. The monoliths were built in pairs, with sufficient space between each two to store irradiating packages.

The " tumuli," designed for wastes packaged in containers stout enough to confine radioactivity, were constructed on the roofs of monoliths. Blocks of concrete were piled on the edges of the roofs and metal casks in the interior. Gravel was poured on the piles and covered with clay and then with earth [AndCm 86].

According to Andra, the wastes received came from the CEA (20.0%), from Cogéma (35.0%), from EDF (35.1%), and from various other sources (9.9%) [quoted in Acro 99]. Acro calculates that the various wastes of military origin “represent about 40% of the alpha activity stored and 43% of the activity from plutonium at the site” [Acro 99].

For the 1985 public inquiry, Andra estimated the activity of wastes when received to have been 382,000 GBq alpha and 41,000,000 GBq beta/gamma. In 1987, after consolidation of an inventory and for a meeting of the Commission de surveillance du CSM, Andra estimated the activity, still when the waste was received, to have been 431,000 GBq alpha and 46,500,000 GBq beta/gamma. For tritium, Andra presented an overall figure of 898,017 GBq in 1995; in 1997, 1,270,000 GBq.

According to the 1995 dossier submitted by Andra in preparation for CSM's entry into the surveillance mode, for the period from 1969 to the end of 1984 the authorities have only "hand written information in the form of declarations drawn up by the producers or in the form of notebooks on arrivals and storage at CSM". Even in the nineties, verification of the contents of the packages occurred virtually only on paper. "The Andra dossier contains no indication of the number of verifications by destructive methods, the only way of really knowing the contents of a package." [Wise 95a].

Between 1969 and 1976 there was no limit on the contents of waste in terms of alpha emitters. From 1976 to 1985 the limits were "voluntary" [Wise 95a]. The basic safety rule (RFS I.2), which set safety objectives for the surface storage centers, did not go into force until 1985.

In the nineties, Andra took steps to end operations, including beginning in 1991 to install what Andra considered to be the definitive cover. In 1995, the agency filed a demand for modification of the authorization in order to change the statute to permit the end of the period of operation and the beginning of the monitoring phase. Following a public inquiry, the inquiry commission declared itself to be in favor of the closure.

At the beginning of 1996, the government nevertheless set up an “independent” scientific commission, which submitted its report July 16, 1996. According to the commission, presided over by M. Turpin, the CSM will not be able to be released for unrestricted use after 300 years as planned, and the cover being installed by Andra cannot guarantee confinement. The commission recommended completing the cover that was under construction and then installing a definitive cover composed of natural materials. The waste should not be removed: “Such an operation would have a radiological cost (…) and its inconveniences and risks are greater than the inconveniences and risks of storage.” Following this report, the government announced that Andra would have to draw up a new dossier to be submitted to a new public inquiry.  

Andra went back through the public inquiry procedure for authorization to embark on the surveillance period. The request was accompanied this time by a request for authorization for release of effluents into the environment. The commission responsible for the public inquiry gave its final report to the prefect June 26, 2000. It agreed to the monitoring phase proposed by Andra, but with three reservations:  These reservations concerned lengthening  the first monitoring phase (very active monitoring);  studying the establishment of increased means of monitoring near the structures presenting the greatest risk; and setting up an inspection and maintenance program for the network of drains that collect the water circulating through the storage center.  The prefect sent its report to DSIN, which prepared a proposed authorization for the monitoring phase and a proposed authorization of releases. The proposals were examined by the Interministerial Commission on INBs, and by the Departmental Health Council for La Manche respectively [DSIN 00].

January 10, 2003 decrees authorizing Andra to implement the "very-active" portion of the surveillance phase and to release gaseous and liquid effluents were signed by the relevant ministers.  The former  (no. 2003-30) requires Andra to submit to DSIN no later than six years after its publication a definitive safety report on the entire installation as well as an updating of general operating regulations, an internal emergency plan, and a monitoring plan, plus a report on the advisability of installing a new and more durable cover in order to ensure, in a passive manner, the safety of the site over the long term [DSIN 02; JO 1.11.03].

The surveillance phase comprises three sub-phases as defined by the Turpin commission: 1) an initial phase of "very active surveillance," probably some ten years long, in which corrective measures are taken and the model of the comportment of the storage units is verified; 2) a phase of "active surveillance," anticipated to be fifty to one-hundred years long; and 3) a phase of "passive surveillance"  [AndWebCM 09].

The center cannot go from the "very active" phase to the "active phase" until the ministers responsible for the environment and industry receive the definitive safety report and accompanying documents and they approve this step, as specified in the 2003 authorization.   

In January 2009, six years after the entry into the surveillance phase, Andra submitted to ASN a final safety report on the installation as a whole and a report on the advisability of installing a new cover.

February 15, 2009, after hearing from the Permanent Group of Waste Experts on Andra's submission, ASN, in a letter from J.L. Lachaume to the director of Andra, imposed a variety of requirements on Andra.

--The current surveillance system must be continued and modeling increased.  The next annual surveillance reports must evaluate the rate of infiltration through the geomembrane.  Within two years Andra must present an interpretation of the evolution of levels of tritium in the drainage network, in the water under the center, and in the streams to the north-west of the site, and must integrate them into its hydrogeologic model.  In its next revision of the site's safety report, Andra must specify how water from the site will be handled, if the facilities now used for this purpose become unavailable or disappear because of the dismantling of Areva's La Hague site.

--As to the cover, Andra plans to make gradual changes.  It intends to reinforce the embankment at the site and then, over fifty years, reduce the steepness of the slope and install a mineral (inorganic) cover over the existing cover.  ASN states that additional information is necessary to determine whether Andra’s plans are feasible and that within five years Andra must submit a report that includes proof that the stability of the embankment can be maintained if the drainage equipment becomes degraded or if there is an earthquake.  Andra must also show that it owns sufficient land to carry out its plans and, in particular, to reduce, if necessary, the steepness of the embankment more than currently envisaged.  

--The memoirs of the CSM (see below) must be improved.

Andra is compiling two memoirs of the center to aid future generations.

a.  A detailed memoir intended for managers of the site.  For the period 1969 to 2003 the memoir, which was worked on from 1984 to 2004, contains more than ten thousand documents.  One copy has been placed at the national archives of France at Fontainebleau and another at the center. ASN's letter of February 2010 (see above) states that the completeness and the coherence of the archive must be re-evaluated, with particular emphasis on information about the packages and about the structures around the site.  Also independent experts must test the archives by using them to obtain information.

b.  A one-volume memoir synthesizing the main information and intended for decision makers and the public, as suggested by the Turpin commission.  A hundred copies are to be placed in a variety of locations.  The first intermediate version was completed in 2008 [ASN 08, Andra CSM 07].  ASN's letter of February 2010  states that the contents of the synthesis must be developed to ensure their easy use by future generations.

V. WASTES CREATED BY THE CSM

Solid wastes

In the surveillance phase, the CSM creates a small amount of solid radioactive waste that must be shipped elsewhere.  In 2007 it produced 1.164 tons of  TFA waste (waste said to be of very low activity), which was to be sent in 2008 to the Center for the Storage of Very Low Activity Waste, the CSTFA at Morvilliers.  The waste came from the cleaning out of pipes and other work of maintenance and surveillance. 

Liquid effluents

Until 2003 CSM had no authorization to emit effluents "apart from a prefectoral decree not signed by the ministers concerned,” which “authorized” the release of up to 1000 Bq/l of tritium into the Sainte Hélène. The association Acro carried out radiological surveillance that found contamination of the surface waters and sediments around the center, and even Andra admitted to the release of liquid effluents into the environment. Andra announced publicly, for example, at Cherbourg November 10, 1995, that measurements in the third quarter of 1995 showed average levels of tritium in the Sainte Hélène and another stream the Grand Bel to be respectively 181 Bq/l et 757 Bq/l [Wise 95a].

Today liquid effluents are transferred to Areva-La Hague after being monitored by Andra.  An agreement between Andra and Cogéma/Areva, based on the decree of 10 January 2003, fixes the details of the transfer, including the characteristics and the quantities of effluents transferred.  According to the 2003 decree, the radioactivity from the BDS released into the ocean cannot exceed annually 125 GBq of tritium, 0.125 GBq of alpha emitters, and 0.25 GBq of beta-gamma emitters (other than tritium) when measured at the BDS.  For releases into the Sainte Hélène, tritium is the only radionuclide regulated.  At the CMG, tritium cannot exceed an annual average of 30 Bq/l or a weekly average of 100 Bq/l.  Limits for chemicals and other qualities of the water at the BDS and CMG have also been set.

Andra reports that in 2007 the water released into the ocean contained at the BDS 0.0047 GBq of alpha activity, 0.0095 GBq of beta gamma activity, not including tritium, and 4.4 GBq of tritium; and that the average concentration of tritium at the CMG was 9.3 Bq/liter [Andra CSM 07].

The CSM is located on marshy land, the Hauts-Marais, where the underground water is near the surface. A document of the Institute for Protection and Nuclear Safety (IPSN) indicates that the water table could be “less than 1 to 2 meters below the surface” when the groundwater is at its highest level, which means that the water would be above certain wastes [CEA-IPSN 79]. Andra claims that the CSM is tight [Andra 93], but has never technically demonstrated this concept. Moreover, Andra is not able to guarantee that the ground water does not inundate the waste, given the high level of the water.

Acro calculates, from data given by Andra, that the alpha activity of the stored wastes at the end of the surveillance phase will be on the order of 568 MBq/t although RFS number I.2. limits the content in alpha emitters to 370 MBq/t. Moreover, given the data of Andra, Wise-Paris shows that the CSM’s wastes contain almost 100 kg of plutonium and almost 200 t of uranium [Wise 95a].

The Turpin commission found that the Fontenay and Valduc centers took waste out of storage and sent it to the CSM in the years immediately preceding the introduction of regulations tightening up the allowable levels of alpha emitters at the CSM. Moreover, a document of Andra received by Acro indicates that wastes contaminated with plutonium were arriving at the CSM in perishable packaging, not protected by an outer covering, into 1994, just before the definitive closure of the center [Acron iii.96].

In regard to tritium, Acro expresses “the most extreme reservations” about Andra’s figure-1,270,000 GBq stored. This figure is less than the 1, 850,000 GBq “lost in the ground” during a 1976 leak [Acro 99].

A document sent anonymously to Acro after the 1995 public inquiry indicated that the level of tritium in the underground water increased continually in numerous piezometers after 1976 and that when a piezometer presented a problem “it was plugged” [Acron iii.96]. 

The principal source of tritium in the surface water around the CSM is the groundwater, polluted in 1976, but the center is continually adding to this contamination. According to an Andra report quoted by Acro, “from the time that the cover was put into place, tritium was measured in its drainage network on and under the asphalt membrane."

For 2005 Andra reported a maximum contamination of tritium under the center of 190,000 Bq/l.  According to Andra, the other readings for tritium at piezometers under the center ranged from 100 Bq/l to 24,000 Bq/l.  Andra reported the average contamination of the water under the center as 6,240 Bq/l.  In 2007 the average contamination under the center as reported by Andra was 5,392 Bq/l.  

For 2005 Andra reported the average contamination in tritium of the Sainte Hélène as 100 Bq/l and of the Grand Bel as 700 Bq/l, corresponding to a decrease by a factor of two since 1996 [Andra Greenpeace 06]. In 2007, as reported by Andra, the average contamination of the Sainte-Hélène was 85 Bq/l and of the Grand Bel 668 Bq/l [Andra CSM 07].

Acro agreed in 2006 that, overall, contamination from tritium had decreased.  However, it noted that the three streams in the area, the Roteures, Sainte-Hélène, and Grand  Bel, were all contaminated at levels between a dozen and several hundred Bq/l and that the level of contamination along a given stream varied, usually being greatest at resurgences [Acro 2006].  In 2007 the levels of tritium, though still declining due to natural decay of the tritium, had not fallen below the levels noted by Acro.

As a result of questions from Acro, ASN, and others  in regard to the high levels of tritium in the groundwater and the Grand Bel, Andra looked into the possibility of setting up a pumping system to treat the groundwater. In May 2008, as a result of its study, Andra reported that it would not be helpful to treat the groundwater to lower the level of tritium in the Grand Bel [ASN 07, 08].  

ASN, in a letter and annexes from J.-L. Lachaume to the director of Andra, 15 February 2010, stated that within two years Andra must present an interpretation of the evolution of levels of tritium in the drainage network, in the water under the center, and in the streams to the north-west of the site, and must integrate them into its hydrogeologic model. 

The Center stores “25,000 t of metallic lead, 2,200 t of lead sulfate, 15 t of cadmium, 0.9 t of mercury,” according to the Turpin commission. The metals will never disappear [Acro 99].

In spite of the law of December 30, 1991, forbidding the storage in France of imported radioactive waste [JO l.i.92], the majority of the waste described as weakly active coming from reprocessing in UP2, including waste from the reprocessing of foreign fuel from 1996 to 1990, are found under the cover at CSM. [Wise 95a].

Maintenance of the Cover and Drains

Movement of the cover, resulting from the settling of the waste, causes visible cracks in the vegetable layer of the cover.  At the top of the slopes cracks appear "regularly."  In 2005 82 meters of cracks were repaired; in 2006, 103 meters; in 2007, 50 meters,  From time to time movement of the cover also causes drains to become disconnected.  In particular, on the top of the slope, the horizontal pipes above the membrane become detached from the oblique pipes. A team of technicians must watch out for and repairs cracks and drains.

In 2007 Andra noticed a gliding of the top of the slope of panel 110 East.  To prevent the movement from becoming greater during heavy rains and to safeguard the interior road at this point, Andra constructed a retaining wall and furnished it with a drainage system [Andra CSM 07]. In 2003 at approximately the same point, between drainage chambers 8 and 9, a pipe had had to be inserted into a gutter and covered with cement in order to prevent the gutter, which carries rainwater, from breaking [Andra Perspec ix.03].

On 16 October 2009 Andra began repairing a collapse of the cover, approximately 8 meters by 4 meters in the northeast portion of the site.  The sinking was first detected in 1999 and became stable after ten years at a depth of 50 centimeters.  Repairs will consist of filling with gravel, cavities that were created by the collapse of partially filled containers, under the cover.  At the same time Andra is examining the state of the bituminous membrane, which assures the impermeability of the cover [Andra 19.xi.09]  

In order to carry out the projected surveillance, a budget of 12 to 13 million francs a year until the year 2300 will be necessary. M. Kaluzny, director of Andra, has wondered himself: “Do financial instruments guaranteeing such revenues for three hundred years actually exist?” [LeMo l.xi.95].

--revised 13 November 2009

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