Nuclear France: materials and sites

By Mary Byrd Davis

 
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ROVENCE-ALPES-COTE-D’AZUR

CENTRE  DE CADARACHE (CEA-CADARACHE)

I. DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, AND TREATMENT OF FUEL

I.A Complexe de fabrication des éléments combustibles au plutonium (Complex for the Fabrication of Fuel Elements with Plutonium, CFCa)

Objective: production of Mox and treatment of waste

Installations: Atelier de technologie de plutonium (ATPu) and Laboratoire de purification chimique (Chemical Purification Laboratory, LPC)

Operator: CEA until 1991, then Cogéma

Period of operation: 1961-2004

Process: formerly Cobroyage Cadarache (Coca); today Micronized Master Blend (Mimas)

Raw material: plutonium and uranium oxides

Nominal capacity: about 45 t/yr of Mox

Actual production: in 2003, 16.8 t of fuel rods for Mox; 5.1 t of discards

 

I.A.1 ATELIER DE TECHNOLOGIE DU PLUTONIUM (ATPu) --no longer in operation

In its first decades the workshop produced metal fuel for research reactors and the Célestins;  Mox fuel for French fast neutron reactors and for the Dounreay Fast Reactor prototype; and experimental fuel for light water reactors  [Haas 94; Wise ATPu 00]. By 1989 the Superphénix line had been converted to fabricate Mox for pressurized water reactors, with a constant quantity of plutonium treated. ATPu received a license that year to diversify its production.  It produced Mox fuel rods for EDF until 1997 for a total of about 11 t.  Until 1996, the fuel rods were transported for assembly to the FBFC plant at Dessel; then, they were sent to the Melox plant at Marcoule. 

On 1 Feb. 1991 Cogéma took over management of ATPu and of LPC; but the CEA remained the nuclear operator in the regulatory sense [DSIN 93]. Cogéma introduced the Mimas process [Comag viii-x.96].

In 1996 Cogéma announced that ATPu would produce Mox fuel amounting to 25 tons worth of heavy metal (5-6% plutonium) per year during the next decade for German utilities. The Union of German Electricity Producers (VDEW) indicated that "the production of about 300 t of Mox had been essentially entrusted to France" because of the closing of Siemens’ Mox plant [RGN iii-iv.96]. An authorization from the French safety authority in 1996 covers production at ATPu of "all types" of Mox rods, ie for German BWRs as well as PWRs [DSIN 96]. In 1997 the plant produced 32 t of Mox fuel rods for German utilities. The rods were apparently transported to Dessel for assembly.

The workshop has fabricated special fuel for experimental projects, as needed. In 1995-96, it made Capra assemblies (composed 32% of plutonium) and Nacre assemblies (containing some pastilles that were 2% neptunium oxide) [Comag x-xii.94; Con iv.97].

The DSIN estimates that production capacity is almost 45 t of Mox per year.  Philippe Pradel of Cogéma has confirmed the existence of two lines of production at ATPu, but has declared that only one of them is used for the manufacture of Mox for light water reactors.  ATPu and LPC were created before the decree of December 1963 establishing the INB regime.  Like all the nuclear installations prior to this decree, they were inscribed on the list of INB by a simple declaration by the operator, the CEA.  In the absence of an authorizing text setting down the conditions of operation, they are not under any production limitation [Wise ATPu 00].

Cogéma announced January 22, 2003 that it planned to end commercial production at ATPu July 31, 2003.  The announcement was the result of Cadarache's not being in conformity with earthquake protection regulations. (See below under "Problems.") Bringing the plant into conformity would not be practical from a technical or an economic point of view, Cogéma said. [AFP 23.i.03]  The plant did in fact cease commercial production July 16, 2003, after  it manufactured for the last time Mox fuel rods destined for Germany [AFP 28.7.03]. The manufacture of Mox for German utilities is being transferred to Melox at Marcoule.

Nevertheless, Cogéma submitted to French safety authorities an application to fabricate at ATPu the Mox fuel rods for the four Lead Test Assemblies (LTA) for the US plutonium disposition program.  The rods, which Cogéma sought to assemble in the Melox plant at Marcoule, were to  be tested in Duke Power's Catawba-1 nuclear reactor in South Carolina in the spring of 2005.  The United States and Russia had agreed to each dispose of 34 tons of surplus weapons plutonium by making it into Mox fuel and burning the Mox in power plants.  Since the United States did not yet have a plant for the fabrication of Mox, time would be saved by manufacturing the test assemblies in France [NucF 24.xi.03].

In October 2004, ATPu produced the fuel pellets and fuel rods for the U.S. program.  The roads were shipped to the Melox plant, where they were made into assemblies early in 2005.

Problems

An IPSN report of 1994 established that the earthquake risk in the Cadarache region "has increased significantly since the end of December 1993" [Wise ATPu 00].  In 1995 DSIN informed Cogéma that the company must shut down the installation shortly after the year 2000 because of the seismic risk. In the meantime it must "take immediate compensatory measures" [DSIN 96]. According to the safety authority, ATPu "would not resist the design earthquake nor even the maximum earthquake plausible from the point of view of history. Moreover, reinforcing the installation would apparently be difficult from the technical standpoint" [DSIN 97]. In 1998 DSIN refused the "plant earthquake resistant roofing project, involving innovative technniques," and "reminded the director of the Cadarache Centre of its request for an unequivocal commitment on closure of the ATPu soon after the year 2000" [DSIN 98]. In January 2001, André Lacoste, director of DSIN indicated that if Cogéma did not furnish a project for closing ATPu before the end of the year 2002, the safety authorities would do whatever was necessary to close it at that time.  As a matter of fact, Cogéma had already presented the elements of a project, but it consisted essentially in transferring production of Mox fom Cadarache to the Melox plant at Marcoule [DSIN 99, 00; NucF 27.xi.00; Wise ATPu 00]. September 3, 2003, it received authorization to increase the capacity of Melox to accommodate the work that had been done at ATPu [Con i.04].

According to technical prescriptions, the plutonium that ATPu receives must be no more than 1% americium.  Because of  the lengthening of lapses of time in the fuel chain, "the accumulation of stocks of plutonium with a considerable portion of americium makes the respect of that limit problematic.  The installation seems to have regularly exceeded that norm in the 90s.  

ATPu was less automated than the Melox plant. Agents manipulated plutonium in glove boxes, which could lead to accidents. On 25 April 1999, an operator, working in a glove box, was pricked by a metal splinter on a container. The splinter penetrated both his protective gloves and contaminated him with powdered plutonium oxide [Con vi.99].

Cogéma notified two German companies of “an anomaly that occurred in software” at ATPu. The German companies, Siemens and the electricity utility Bayernwerk, conducted an audit. The software in question registers the second quality control on statistical samples of fuel pellets. According to Cogéma, the operation of the software “does not affect the quality of the fuel.” Wise-Paris notes that BNFL had the same deficiency and made the same excuse in regard to its manufacture of Mox [Wise ATPu 00].

ATPu and its companion LPC, plus ATUe (below) have a history of "incidents" relating to the handling of fissile materials. On 17 December 1996 at ATPu, for instance, workers introduced into four devices a mass of fisssile material 50% greater than that authorized. The built-in safety margin prevented a criticality accident [Con ii.98]. In 1992, DSIN suspended for several weeks the manipulation of fissile material at ATPu, LPC, and ATUe, because the agency had discovered a lack of respect for technical prescriptions, in particular those designed to prevent criticalities [DSIN 92]. In 1974 ATPu inadvertently sent a Mox fuel rod to ATUe for recovery of the plutonium and itself reprocessed two rods of uranium with 27% uranium 235 that were supposed to be treated at ATUe. The error was not discovered until 1976 when the Mox rod was opened at ATUe and twenty-two people were contaminated, one of whom received 38 rem. When looking at the rods rapidly, workers had no means of distinguishing between the uranium oxide and Mox rods; only a small number on the cap indicated the distinction with certainty [CHSCad 16.v.77].

Shut Down and Dismantling

After commercial production stopped in 2003, Areva NC began removal of plutonium rejects and waste from Cadarache.  The tablets and powders remaining from Mox production were ground up and made into new tablets that were sealed in stainless steel tubes, like fuel rods destined for use.  The filled tubes were then shipped to La Hague for treatment.  Other PuO2 was packaged in metal containers identical to those used at La Hague in order to facilitate its treatment there [Areva Cadarache 05].  The process of shipping material to La Hague was scheduled to be completed by July 2008 [Areva Cadarache 07].

Treatment of the rejects at La Hague necessitated a modification of the authorization for operation of La Hague.  Cogéma asked, in the framework of the procedure for an overall revision of the authorizations for plants UP2-800 and UP-3 at La Hague, an authorization in principle to begin this treatment--under reserve of a specific examination of its safety.  Cogéma received the authorization in principle in 2003 [JO 11.i.03].

Dismantling of glove boxes was underway as early as 2005 [Areva Cadarache 05].  A public inquiry regarding a request by Areva for an authorization for a Definitive Shut Down and Dismantling of Installations was held in June and July 2008. Dismantling on a major scale is planned to begin in 2009 and to finish around 2013.

                                                                                                --updated 17 September 2008

I.A.2 LABORATOIRE DE PURIFICATION CHIMIQUE, LPC

For ATPu, this workshop assures the quality of the pastilles and the treatment of wastes and rejects, especially to recover fissile material. As of 1994, COGÉMA treated separately the "rejects," the "dirty rejects," the "rich rejects" and the ordinary "wastes." 

The "rejects" were recycled directly at the stage of powder mixing; the "dirty rejects” were treated by chemical means, if necessary by an extraction cycle of the Purex type.

A dry procedure was to be put into use in 1995. For this process, the rejects were burned to ashes under a reducing atmosphere and then ground. The powder produced could be added to the fresh powder up to a level of 20%.

The "rich wastes" were treated according to type. The cellulose wastes underwent acid digestion. Metallic wastes were washed with freon (because freon destroys atmostpheric ozone, a substitute should now be in use). Wastes that could be ground, after grinding, underwent alkaline washing. The sludge coming from the three processes was sent to a treatment unit for rejects, sometimes after dissolution and filtration or drying. The wastes included sulphuric wastes, contaminated freon, and alkaline wastes [Haas 94].

In 1985 the CEA put into use for the treatment of "rich wastes" a line that included cryogenic grinding. The CEA noted in 1990 that the installation for cryogenic grinding was to be "closed down in 1990, because of problems related to the difficulty in controlling the retention of plutonium in the installation (risk of criticality)" [CEAP 90]. Dismantling of the cryogenic facility is to begin in 2001 and last into 2004 [CEAD 97].

(Despite the treatment facilities at LPC, apparently rejected fuel pellets were placed in stainless steel fuel rods, which were bundled, and sent to La Hague for storage in HAO/Nord [DSIN 97]. )

 

I.B Workshop for the Treatment of Enriched Uranium (Atelier de traitement de l’uranium enrichi, ATUe)--no longer in operation

Purpose: production of UO2 and treatment of waste

Operator: CEA

Period of operation: 1965-1995, except the incinerator -1997

Process: conversion by the dry method and the wet method

Raw materials: UF6, wastes and rejects from other sites

Production was stopped in 1995, but the incinerator continued to operate until the end of 1997. In 1994, ATUe was responsible for:

--the conversion of UF6 from enrichment plants into compressable UF6;

--chemical reprocessing of rejects from the manufacture of fuel rods to recover uranium;

--“melting of uranium metal for isotopic adjustments in a liquid medium”;

---incineration of weakly radioactive organic liquids [DSIN 94].

The incinerator, which went into service in 1981, offered in 1988 a 20-50 liter capacity. According to CEA researchers, the facility released less than 3,700 Bq/m3 of gas. It created 7 kg of ashes/m3 of liquids incinerated, except for solvent containing TBP; for TBP, 70 kg/m3 of liquids because of the addition of a calcium salt [Bartoli 88]. It was the CEA’s only incinerator for alpha-contaminated organic liquids [Con x.96].

Dismantling is scheduled to begin in 2003 [DSIN 00]. When materials were being moved as part of the preparation for dismantling, 10 g of plutonium were unexpectedly found in a batch of uranium oxide [NucF 25.viii.97].

I.C Laboratoire d’examen de combustibles actifs (Radioactive Fuel Examination Laboratory, Leca)

Station de traitement assainissement reconditionnement (Treatment, Cleansing, and Repackaging Station, Star)

Purpose: examination, treatment, and packaging of fuel, particularly old fuel

Operator: CEA

Period of operation: Leca, since 1964; Star, since 1995

Process: for old fuel, drying, hydridation, and oxidation

Nominal capacity: Star, 450 fuel rods/year

Leca carries out destructive and nondestructive examinations of UNGG, PWR (in particular, Mox), and fast neutron reactor fuel, and fuel irradiated in experimental reactors at Cadarache.  Leca is undergoing major renovation, which began in October 2000.  The CEA hopes to be able to use the installation into 2010. The security of the renovated installation was to be reevaulated during 2001, by the Groupe permanent d'experts chargé des laboratoires et des usines (which works with DSIN).

Star, an extension of Leca, is intended primarily for the treatment and repackaging of irradiated UNGG . It also carries out destructive and nondestructive examinations of PWR fuel. “[Star] is expected to take over eventually the examinations conducted today at Leca” [DSIN 99].

In September 1998 DSIN authorized the installation of the procedure Fabrice (refabrication of short fuel rods), formerly in Saclay’s Leci, in cell 6 of Leca. [Con xii.98].

Star’s first project is the treatment and packaging of 16 t of old UNGG fuel, stored for more than 25 years in two pools in INB 56 at Cadarache. Processing of the fuel in the two pools should be completed around 2006 [CEAPr 18.xi.99]. Water has entered the interior of the fuel containers and reacted with the uranium metal, creating unstable and pyrophoric products.  In Cell C1, the CEA removes the cladding and stabilizes the fuel in a furnace with means for drying, dehydridation, and oxidation of the uranium metal. The stabilized fuel is sealed in containers in aluminum/AG3 alloy, and temporarily stored in a trench in cell C3 and then transported to a reprocessing plant or, since the shut down of UP1, towards the Cascad installation  [CNE 98].  

In the future, Star will carry out special projects, perhaps the stabilization of the fuel from Brennilis. The installation is equipped to receive and to dispatch most types of European containers [défi ix.94]. Thus it will be able to treat fuel from foreign countries.

ATMOSPHERIC EFFLUENTS

Star is authorized to release 37 TBq/year of radioactive effluents including 3 Tbq/year of tritium. The release of alpha particles is forbidden [JO 31.vii.94].

The disintegration of the surface of UNGG fuel would generate pulverulent uranium contaminated with fission products. The CEA noted in 1994 that cell C1 where the fuel is treated “is expected to be highly contaminated” [CEAD 94]. To achieve zero release of alpha particles, the filtration systems would have to be 100% efficient, a rare if not an impossible achievement.

LIQUID EFFLUENTS

The “definitive study” notes that water in fuel containers will be quickly eliminated by evaporation in the extraction circuit. This water will be highly contaminated. It will therefore be necessary to use extremely efficient means of filtration.

SOLID WASTES

For each 450 containers of stabilized fuel elements, the CEA produces 4.5 t of highly contaminated steel wastes from the original containers, 500 kg of magnesium from the cladding, and 30 kg of aluminum alloy from rejected new containers. Maintenance of the cells likewise creates solid wastes [CEA (93?)]. In March 1997 DSIN authorized the storage of magnesium wastes from Star in Cadarache’s Storage Park for Radioactive Waste (INB 56) [Con vi.97].

I.D Atelier de découpage des assemblages combustibles (Workshop for Cutting Up Fuel Assemblies, LDAC)-shut down

The workshop monitored and packaged irradiated fuel rods; and carried out neutronography studies for military ends until 1994. In the basement was a neutronography reactor “essentially composed of a vat containing a solution of uranyl nitrate enriched to 93%” [DSIN 92].

In 1991 the CEA emptied the uranyl nitrate solution and sent back to Valduc the solution and the effluents from rinsing the circuits.

Likewise, in 1991, the CEA informed the DSIN that three cells that treated fuel would be dismantled in 1994-95.

Apparently the workshop was damaged in the explosion during the treatment of sodium from Rapsodie, 31 March 1994. (Rapsodie and LDAC are both part of INB 25.) In May 1995 the workshop was still in a “post-accident context,” and inspectors visited it to make sure of the quality of the dismantling “or” construction taking place [Con viii.95]

In March 1997 the CEA informed the DSIN of the final cessation of activities at the Laboratory and of the start of operations that will lead to the final shutdown [Con vi.97]. In 2000 the shop had been cleaned and was awaiting dismantling. In November 2000, DSIN authorized the operation of a laboratory of radioactive metalography, an ICPE located in the same laboratory as LDAC [DSIN 00].

I.E Laboratoire d’études et de fabrication des combustibles avancés (Laboratory for Studies and Fabrication of Advanced Fuel, Lefca)

Purpose: R&D concerning plutonium-based fuel

Operator: CEA

Period of operation: since 198? ; operation was authorized in 1981

Procedure: dry process

Raw materials: plutonium, uranium, and minor actinides

Nominal capacity: several hundred kg of fuel

Lefca carries out basic studies on plutonium, uranium, actinides, and their compounds; studies outside the reactor relating to the behavior of fuel in the reactor and in different stage of the fuel chain, and the manufacture of capsules and experimental assemblies.

Using dry processes, the laboratory can carry out programs relating to PWR/Mox fuel and those concerning Capra and Spin.  Equipment includes an experimental fabrication line and a pilot fabrication line (Inca, New Installation for Advanced Fuel [Installation nouvelle pour combustibles avancés]).  Inca is composed of a line for the production of Mox at 1/10 industrial scale. The capacity is several hundred kg of fuel; Inca can manipulate one kg of fissile material [DSIN 92]. 

PROBLEMS

In the last few years, the laboratory has experienced a series of problems relating to the management of fissile material. The most important was observed in July 1997:  during the investigation undertaken by the operator, the operator found 170 g of plutonium in a lot believed to contain only natural uranium oxide [DSIN 98; Con vii.98].  After that incident, the activities of the laboratory were stopped , and the CEA began an inventory of material in the laboratory, including the powder store and a store of fuel rods [Con xii.98].

A partial restart of the laboratory was authorized in April 1999 in order to make the inventory possible [Con x.99].  In February 2000, after completion of the inventory, resumption of nominal activity was authorized [DSIN 00].

The safety document transmitted by the CEA in 1996 and 1997 was judged not receivable in 1998 in regard to the earthquake risk.  The safety document and the results of the inventory were to be the subject, during 2001, of  examination by the Groupe permanent d'experts (working with DSIN).

I.F Labo UO2

This laboratory carries out the qualification of UO2 powders and “simulation of certain stages of the process of fabricating Mox fuel while replacing plutonium by other elements (such as cerium).” All the elaboration processes can be tested [Millet 95].

I.G Technicatome Workshops

Technicatome is the industrial contractor that designs and produces nuclear reactors for submarines and for the aircraft carrier Charles-de-Gaulle. Its means of testing are grouped at Cadarache in the INBS-PN (Propulsion navale)::

--prototype reactors (see below)

--“halls for mechanical and electrical tests, for the development of various components (….), for assembly, and for the maintenance of embarked equipment”

--“ a workshop for the fabrication of fuel for all prototype reactors and for the series equipping the SNLE, SNA, and aircraft carrier Charles-de-Gaulle” [CEACad nd].

                                                                                                         

copyrigh t© Yggdrasil 2001-2007; copyright © EcoPerspectives 2008

 

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