Uranium from the fuel of Zoe, the first French nuclear reactor, fabricated between 1946 and 1948, was of Belgian origin or rather from the Belgian Congo. In 1948, researchers from the CEA discovered the first major French seam at la Crouzille (Nord Limousin); and, in 1949, the CEA began to produce concentrates from the ore in this seam. Other discoveries and the exploitation of mines in other regions followed. In the forties and fifties, the rich ore, with uranium up to 20 percent, was exploited. Since the fifties, the ore mined in France has contained only a small proportion of natural uranium ore, 0.1 to 1 percent. Nevertheless, for some forty years France extracted an important part of its uranium from its own territory.

In 1988, the production of uranium in France was 3,394 tons [InfoU ix-xii.93]; in 1999, it was only 439 tons [CogRa 99]. At the beginning of 1997, France had 12,460 tons of uranium at $80 or less per kilogram [OCDE 00], but the last mine in France closed in May 2001.

On the other hand, the interests of Cogéma abroad are increasing, notably in Canada. In 1999, Cogéma and its subsidiaries produced 1,800 tons of uranium in Canada [CogRa 99].

This orientation of Cogéma in regard to mines has resulted in the exportation of waste and the problems tied to mines and concentration installations (see Extraction). Today, it is principally abroad that newly produced waste rock and tailings pose a problem. In this regard, we should note that many of the mines outside French territory are located on lands belonging to indigenous populations. Mining activities outside France are the following:

In Gabon, Cogéma has 68.42% and the State of Gabon 25.8% ownership of the Franceville Uranium Mines Company (Comuf). This company mined the uranium deposits of Mounana [CogRa 94]. Discovered in 1956, these deposits have yielded more than 25,000 tons of uranium.

The content was around 0.4% (4 kilograms of uranium per ton of ore). The concentration factory of Comuf possessed a nominal capacity of 1,500 tons per year of uranium. The production of uranium in Gabon ended around June 1999, due to exhaustion of the reserves, according to Cogéma. The company carried out restoration operations on the Mounana site. It projected completion of recovery for the entire company in 2000 [CogRa 98].

Since the 1970’s, Cogéma has participated in two companies in Niger that mine seams opened to Cogéma by the government of Niger. In 1999 the two companies produced a total of at least 3000 tons of uranium [CogRa 99].

Presently, Somair produces 1,000 tons of uranium per year from open-air mines.

The veins mined, which have a content of 0.3-0.35% [Cogéma 96], include Taza and Takrisa. Since its creation, Somair has produced more than 30,000 t of uranium. Since 1970, Somair has had a factory for treatment of the ore that produces sodium uranate. The nominal capacity is 1,500 tons of uranium per year. The concentrates are exported for conversion, mostly to Comurhex [Comag vii-ix. 95; OCDE 96].

This company was created in 1974. By the end of 1994, it had produced more than 30,000 tons of uranium. The present production amounts to 2000 tons per year from an underground mine of the Akouta-Akola seam. The content is from 0.45% to 0.55% [Cogéma 1996]. Since 1978, Cominak has had at Akouta an ore concentration factory that produces magnesium uranate. The nominal capacity is 2,000 tons/year of uranium. The concentrates, for the most part, are transported to Comurhex for conversion [Comag vii-ix 95; OCDE 96].

Madagascar

Exploration began in 1999.

In Canada, Cogéma Resources Inc. (Canada), a 100% subsidiary of Cogéma, combines the mining activities of Cogéma. All of its operations, except for Baker Lake, in the Northwest Territories, are in Saskatchewan. Practically all of the sites in question are found on the territories of native peoples.

Through Cogéma Resources, Cogéma participates in the exploitation of the following sites:

This site contains reserves of 128,000 tons of uranium with an average content of 13.7% of uranium [DiehlWeb]. The seam is 450 meters underground. Cogéma plans to start producing in 2005, subject to relevant authorizations. The ore will be treated in two existing plants, 57% in that of Rabbit Lake, 43% in the one at McClean Lake [CogWeb 01;DiehlWeb01].

Since 1980, Cogéma has been mining both underground and open-air deposits at Cluff Lake. They have an average content of 0.5-1% and have produced a total of over 19,000 tons, at a production pace varying from 700 to 1,500 tons per year depending on market needs. Exploitation had been suspended.  By the end of 2000, the residue storage basin’s capacity had been reached, and the identified remaining reserves of less than 10,000 tons did not justify new investments in storage at that time [Comag xi, xii. 98-i.99; CogWeb 01]

This site contains an identified reserve of 8,500 tons of uranium (as of the end of 1999) at 1.51%. In October 1999, Cameco announced the discovery of a possible deposit of high grade ore on the mining concession of Lake La Roque [Diehl Web].

At the end of 1999, the reserves amounted to only 847 tons, but the plant treats the McArthur River ore.

The geological reserves of the site are estimated to be 152,000 tons of uranium at 18%. They are located 600 meters underground. Cameco is the site operator. Mining began December 1999. Full production of 6930 tons of uranium per year should be reached in 2002. The ore is treated at the Key Lake plant [DiehlWeb 01; NucF v.17.99].

The reserves add up to around 20,000 tons at a content of 2.0% [DiehlWeb01]. Cogéma is the operator of the mine and of a new processing factory that started up in 1999. The factory will process the ore from Midwest, from McClean Lake, and 43% of that from Cigar Lake {CogRa 99; DiehlWeb 00].

The reserves are estimated at 15,000 tons at a content of 0.41% [DiehlWeb01].

The mining activities of Cogéma are carried out within the framework of Cogéma Resources Inc (USA), its 100% subsidiary, which is placed under the operational control of Cogéma Resources Inc. (Canada). By means of two 100% subsidiaries, Cogéma Minerals (Comin) and Pathfinder Mines Corporation (PMC), Cogéma was operational in the on-site leaching of uranium in Wyoming and Texas. On certain projects, it works in association with an EDF subsidiary, Malapai Resources Corporation. Production in Wyoming amounted to only 75t in 1999 and ended in 2000. Remediation was taking place in 2001 [CogRa 99].

Cogéma Australia controls 7.5% (of which 6.2% through Urangesellschaft) of the shares of the company Energy Resources of Australia (ERA), which is presently mining the Ranger Deposits of the Northern Territory and which has a production capacity of around 5,000 tons of uranium per year [Comag v-vii.96]. ERA plans to exploit the Jabiluka project found near Kakadu National Park, a site classified as “world heritage” by UNESCO. However, Rio Tinto, the major owner of ERA has imposed a ten-year moratorium on the project [DiehlWeb 01].

In 1996, Cogéma and Kazatomprom, a Kazakh state organism (formerly called Katep), created a common enterprise for the exploitation of uranium deposits around Muyumkum, in the south of Kazakhstan. In 1999, a governmental decree authorized the transfer of mining permits held by Kazatomprom to the Katco Company, whose principal stockholders were Kazatomprom (50%) and Cogéma (40%), the mine operator. Subject to the conclusion of a Convention of Establishment, Katco was to build a pilot installation to process uranium-bearing solutions extracted by on-site leaching, beginning in the summer of 1999 [Comag xi-xii.98/i.99 & v-vi.99].  As of mid-2004, pilot production had been carried on for three years.

In April 2004, the ownership of the Katco joint venture changed to become Areva/Cogéma 51% and Kazatomprom (49%).  With Areva/Cogéma controlling the venture, the European firm agreed to supply all the financing for launching the industrial phase of the project.  The industrial facility is to begin operation by the end of 2005. Capacity will be gradually increased to reach 1500 metric tons/year of uranium by 2008-2009.   The new finishing plant will be able to process 2000 metric tons of uranium per year, including leaching solutions from other deposits.  

Kazakhstan has more than 350,000 tons of uranium resources.  The deposits to be exploited by Katco are currently estimated at 43,700 metric tons.  Kazakhstan represents 9% of Areva/Cogema's uranium reserves [NucF 10.v.04].

In 1997, Cogéma and Gobigeo, a small Mongolian drilling company, created the Cogegobi Company (70% of which is held by Cogéma, 30% by Gobigeo), which is exploring three zones, or a total of 13,000 square kilometers [Comag v-vi.99 CogRa 99].

Although France became self-sufficient in natural uranium very early, it did not have the capacity to enrich uranium in industrial quantities until the 60s. For the enriched uranium destined for the research reactors and light water reactors that it began to construct in 1970, it had to turn to other countries, notably the United States.

On the military side, the United States and France signed an agreement May 7, 1959, authorizing France to buy enriched uranium for research on submarine reactors. In 1967, the "military" enrichment plant at Pierrelatte began to produce highly enriched uranium for submarine fuel and for nuclear warheads. That year, the first nuclear test using highly enriched uranium took place. Until that time, France used plutonium 239 as the fissile material for tests and bombs.

During its first years of operation, the Pierrelatte plant served only military ends; but from 1972 on, it also worked for EDF and for foreign utilities as well as for the military [CEARa 72]. In 1979, the civilian plant, Eurodif, located at Pierrelatte and owned by an international consortium including Cogéma produced its first low-enriched uranium for nuclear plants. The production capacity of Eurodif corresponds to the annual renewal of fuel for 100 nuclear reactors, twice the size of the French park.

In spite of its independence concerning highly enriched military uranium and low-enriched civilian uranium, France never decided to become independent in regard to "civilian" medium enriched or highly enriched uranium. According to Nuclear Fuel, Cogéma furnished highly enriched uranium (HEU) to, a French company for fabricating nuclear fuel, but a director of the CEA has indicated that the CEA has never permitted the use of highly enriched uranium from Pierrelatte in its reactors for ethical reasons [NucF 9.ix.96]. In any case, Cogéma declared in 1987, that it was not able to sustain financial competition with the US DOE in the area of medium and high enrichment [NucF 29.vi.87]. The clients of DOE have paid only for the SWU necessary for enrichment to the desired level. Moreover, the DOE has taken back the irradiated fuel and has reimbursed the client for the value of the fissile material that remained in the fuel, even if it had no intention of reprocessing this fuel.

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its January 1993 “Report to Congress on the state of highly enriched uranium exported from the United States” states that as far as it knew, France had received directly from the United States or through a third country, 9133 kg of HEU of American origin (Germany has furnished 1883 kg). Of this quantity, 4104 kg remained in France at the end of 1992. These figures do not include the stocks of non-irradiated uranium noted in a secret appendix to the report.

France stopped the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in mid-1966. But HEU is still used in France in two research reactors, despite international non-proliferation efforts intended to reduce the rate of enrichment of the fuel in this type of reactor. The characteristics and the performances of the two reactors, the High Flux Reactor (HFR) of the Institut Laue-Langevin (ILL) and Orpheus at Saclay, would be affected too much by the use of available fuel with less than 20% of uranium 235.

There is no lack in France of HEU destined for military purposes. President Chirac and his defense minister, in announcing the closure of the Pierrelatte enrichment plant, noted that France has a stock of highly enriched uranium sufficient for some fifty years [LeMo 25-26.ii.96]. Pierrelatte is believed to have produced 20-30 t of uranium of military quality, and France has used between 7.4 and 14.8 t in nuclear warheads, without counting the uranium in dismantled arms that was to be reused. Thus a stock of at least about 7 tons of military HEU remains and perhaps more than 20 tons [Albright 97].

On the civilian side, the situation is more tense. As noted, France has always obtained from the United States a great part of the HEU that it needed for civilian ends, and it has sent back the irradiated fuel containing that uranium. France, in 1994, managed a stock of more than 200 kg of civilian HEU, non-irradiated, from America. However, most of it was stored at Cerca, which stocks nuclear materials for other European institutions [NucF 23.v.94, 6.xi.95]. The CEA stated that in France in 1998, there remained only a little non-irradiated fuel of American origin [NucF 9.ix.96].

The United States is still exporting uranium enriched to less than 20%. But in 1992, because of its non-proliferation policy, it stopped exporting HEU to the signatory nations of Euratom. Moreover, at the expiration of the programs for returning foreign irradiated fuels-1998 for HEU and 1992 for uranium enriched to less than 20%, it stopped accepting these fuels. Consequently, France has had to find HEU for Orpheus and the HFR, and the irradiated fuel has piled up in storage pools [CEAD 94].

Theoretically, France could have recovered HEU from the fuel of the research reactors that was reprocessed at Marcoule, but Cogéma did not want to invest in the necessary modifications in the UP1 factory [NucF 9.ix.96]. France has obtained for the HFR part of the non-irradiated, highly enriched uranium from the German reactor THTR-300, which was closed down in 1990.Then, in April 1996, France signed with Russia an agreement on supplying to France 55 kilograms per year of uranium enriched to 93% for the HFR for nine years, and around 125 kilograms for the Orpheus reactor, or a total of around 620 kilograms.

It is not the first time that the Russian ministry of nuclear energy has furnished HEU to Cerca [Nuc 25.x.93, 17.vi.96, & 6.v.96]. Nevertheless, because of administrative and licensing problems within Russia, the Russian HEU was slow in arriving. In November 1998, ILL signed an agreement with the U.S government according to which it will switch its HFR (High Flux Reactor) from HEU to low-enriched uranium as soon as low-enriched fuel becomes available. In return, the United States promised to facilitate shipment of 69 Kilograms of HEU stored at Oak Ridge that ILL has paid for, to continue to provide HEU when needed, and if conversion occurs, to supply low-enriched uranium.

The U.S. has not yet had to fulfill its promise, for the first cargo of Russian HEU reached France on December 28, 1998. Russian sent 227.5 kilograms by civilian air, 55 kg for each of three years of the operation of the HFR and 62.5 kg, or around three years supply for the Orpheus operation. In return, Russia earned the right to examine the research program of the Grenoble reactor. Moreover, this shipment enabled Russia to pay off a debt to France of 19 million francs for scientific equipment [NucF 11.i.99].

At present, it is impossible to know when or if Russia will fulfill its contractual commitment to send to France another 55 kg per year of 93% enriched uranium for six years for the HFR and 62.5 kilograms for Orpheus. Moreover, some industrialists wonder if the United States is going to send the HEU promised to ILL in the event that Russia does not furnish its share. (The same uncertainties pertain to U.S promises with regard to supplying the BR2 reactor of the SCK/CEN research center in Belgium and the European Commission’s High Flux Reactor at Petten, in the Netherlands. These two research centers have also signed a commitment to convert as soon as possible) [NucF 17.iv.00]

On May 13, 1996, the US Department of Energy announced, in a “Report of decision on a policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons concerning spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors” that it has decided to resume for thirteen years the return to the United States of fuels and targets from foreign research reactors. More precisely, it would take back those containing uranium enriched in the United States or considered as aluminum-based materials or originating from Triga reactors of the American company General Atomics.

Nonetheless, the CEA reprocessed the MTR (Material Testing Reactor) uranium/aluminum fuels coming from the Orpheus and Siloé UP1 installations, shortly before the cessation of UP1 [CEAD 98]. Moreover, Cogéma is presently proposing to reprocess at La Hague the irradiated uranium/aluminum fuel from materials testing reactors. The reprocessing can be performed by dilution of the MTR fuel in the dissolved fuel of light water reactors. ILL and SCK/CEN have both signed reprocessing contracts with Cogéma, and have already sent waste to La Hague [NucF 17.iv.00]. La Hague has also received two lots (0.15 tons in total) of research reactor fuels from Australia. In 1999, Cogéma agreed by a contract signed with Ansto (Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization) to reprocess 1,300 elements of MTR fuel from the Hifar reactor of Lucas Heights, and also perhaps, in the future, from the successor to this reactor. Cogéma has also signed a contract with the University of Strasbourg,

Cogéma stores at La Hague fuels from research reactors [NucF 1.v.00]. As of late 2001, UP1 and UP2 had not obtained authorization to process research fuels. The UP2-400 installation is authorized to do so. The DSIN asked UP2-400 to cease all reprocessing in 2001 [NucF 24.i.100]. But Cogéma does not seem to have taken account of this request.

By enriching natural uranium, France produces depleted uranium in great quantity. The French stock of natural depleted uranium is always increasing because of the continuous operation of the Eurodif plant and because of the fact that only a small fraction of the depleted uranium produced is actually used. The nuclear industry affirms that depleted uranium is a usable material, but its future remains uncertain.

Eurodif enriched 130,000 tons of uranium between 1979 and 1989. It enriched 16,268 tons in 1998 and 17,785 tons in 1999 [DSIN 98 & 99]. Recently, Eurodif has been operated at well below its optimal rate of production, because of excess on the enriched uranium market. If one calculates that the plant enriched around 18,000 tons per year on the average from 1990 to 1999, it had reached a total of some 310,000 tons by the end of 1999. Around 85% of the uranium processed for the fuel of classic pressurized water reactors (or 3.25% U235) becomes depleted uranium. Consequently, Eurodif has probably created something like 263,500 tons of depleted uranium.

The Pierrelatte site is authorized to store 110,000 to 120,000 tons of depleted UF6 from Eurodif. This quantity will have to be reduced to 50,000 tons by 2005 [DSIN].

According to Cogéma, the W plant of Pierrelatte transforms UF6 from Eurodif to U308, more stable than UF6, and into fluorohydric acid to be used on the site or to be sold. Park P19 of Pierrelatte is used for the storage of 159,000 tons of U308 containing 134,035 tons of depleted uranium, and Park P9 of Pierrelatte is used to store perhaps 2,000 tons of U308 [see Pierrelatte]. The Cogéma plant of Miramas stores 12,000 tons of of U308 [LePr 4.vi.91]. Cogéma has been authorized to store 199,900 tons of U308, containing around 170,000 tons of depleted uranium, on the industrial site of the Simo Company, at Bessines. Thus, the storage capacity for U308 adds up to around 315,000 tons of uranium.

The military plant of Pierrelatte, which enriched uranium to around 93%, created more depleted uranium per ton of uranium processed-211,671 kilograms per 212,672 kg processed, according to the CDRPC. Using the production figures already quoted-between 20 and 30 tons of military HEU-we arrive at a production of 4233 to 6350 tons of depleted uranium. Have the CEA and Cogéma used all of this uranium? The storage sites presented above are intended only for the Eurodif production.

Part of the DU (depleted uranium) produced in France was used in metallic form in covers of rapid neutron reactors, in nuclear and kinetic weapons, and in special projects such as Starlette, a geodesic satellite whose core was comprised of 34.5 kg of DU [DAM vii.75].

Part of it also is used in oxide form in Mox fuels. But the portion of production that is used is low. EDF calculates that after 2000, the Mox manufactured for its park will absorb only 125 tons of DU per year [CNE 96]. According to WISE-Paris, the manufacture of 135 tons of Mox requires 125 tons of DU [Wise 00].

It seems that another small part of the DU is used in the standard UO2 fuel. The DU from the enrichment of uranium for the REP fuel still contains U235 at a content of around 0.25% [Birraux 94]. Yves Coupin, of Cogéma, confirmed in December 1998 that Cogéma regularly sends to Russia some DU from Eurodif for enrichment. The quantity varies from one month to another, but according to Mr. Coupin, it represents “a very small percentage” of the DU produced by Eurodif. According to him, the enrichment of DU proves that it is a re-usable material, and not a waste; the enrichment in Russia is justified economically and also helps Russia to use the idle part of its enrichment capacity [NucF 28.xii.98]. 

Cogema has stated that it intends to enrich depleted uranium for fuel in France when the price of natural uranium increases to a "significant" extent and if it has other means of disposal. It would use the Avlis (Silva in France) process, if Avlis were developed to the industrial level. However, the decision has been made to stop development of Avlis in France in favor of perfecting centrifugation. Therefore, if France enriches depleted uranium, France like Russia, will use centrifuges.

The authorization of 1989 (XUO8689) to Cerca, is for uranium and titanium cylinders from Aerojet Ordnance Tennessee, which fabricates depleted uranium weapons for the American army. According to the authorization, Cerca was going to carry out tests within the framework of an international research and development project.

Why did France buy depleted uranium in the United States when it has so much in France? The reasons could be financial considerations tied to the price proposed by Cogéma. Another more obvious reason could be the form used: the biggest part of the depleted uranium bought by France was in the form of metal. When the production of uranium metal at Malvési ended, France lost its most important installation for the conversion of depleted UF4 (produced from depleted UF6) into metal. It is not possible to use recycled metal in projectiles. During a round table, in 1988, M.Ambolet of Bruyères-le-Châtel announced that the Dam had “100 tonnes [of depleted uranium] on its hands . . . If you want to propose a deal, our prices truly defy all competition.” G. Lemaire of SCPRI then answered: “You have not had offers from the military, which makes projectiles?” Ambolet answered: “No, because they demand great chemical and metallographic purity” [Compte 88].

Cogéma states that it plans to enrich uranium for fuel in France when the price of natural uranium increases “significantly’, and when it has other means of enrichment, in other words, the Silva process (See Enrichment). At this time, Silva, which is equally crucial for the future of reprocessed uranium, is far from being mastered, and the process is not without risks for the environment and for health.

Before using this process, researchers must resolve many problems. For example, they have to obtain components that resist high temperatures and the corrosive effect of liquid uranium, while the recovery of uranium 235 and Uranium 238 from the separators is not easy to accomplish [dèfi ii.93].

From the perspective of the nuclear industry, the process, if it works, will offer a few advantages, notably the fact that it is more selective than enrichment by gaseous diffusion, and that enrichment to around 5% requires only one step. Moreover, it uses significantly less electricity than gaseous diffusion.

Nevertheless, it presents equally important disadvantages:

Unlike the Chemex process, the Silva technology creates risks of proliferation. A country that can obtain a module will have the capacity to enrich uranium rapidly for military needs in a small installation easy to camouflage. The process can also be adapted to obtain military plutonium isotopes. In fact, France has worked on the development of plutonium enrichment by laser.

An efficient use of the Silva process would necessitate changes in the fuel chain, now centered on UF6. It would be necessary to build new plants. In certain forms used, uranium carries risks to workers. The derivatives of beta-emitting uranium are concentrated on the surface of the melted uranium and in the coolest parts of the oven, and uranium oxide forms on the surface of metallic uranium in contact with air. The vacuum container that encloses the separator contains water-cooled structures and melted uranium. If the water leaks and comes into contact with the uranium, there could be either a steam explosion, or more likely a superpressurization of steam, which could cause a leak of part of the content of the separator through open valves.

In separators, uranium meets two conditions that can cause a fire, either a finely divided form, or a very high metal temperature. That could also end up in a fire in which the uranium would burn while not being the main fuel [US DOE 91a].